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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

land necessary for the project and clearly stated that the project would
"enable future development and growth." Absent the presentation at
trial of supporting evidence to the contrary, the trial judge
appropriately decided these issues in favor of the City.
The Winters also argued that because the drainage project would
clearly benefit many private landowners, the project could not be
considered a public use, therefore, the project was not an appropriate
cause of a condemnation action. The Winters argued that as a result
of the classification of this project by the City as a mere "drainage"
project and not a "flood" control project, the primary purpose was not
a public use. However, the court did not accept this distinction and
instead noted that the incidental private benefit that may result from
the taking of property for a primarily public use will not defeat the
taking. Evidence established that the drainage project may also
constitute a flood control project. Thus, whether the project corrected
disastrous flooding conditions or less significant drainage problems,
the project was appropriately deemed a public use.
The final issue appealed was the City's entitlement to immediate
possession of the property under the state "quick-take" statute. The
"quick-take" statute allows a city to take immediate possession of
property when it proves that it would suffer "irreparable harm and
delay" if regular eminent domain proceedings were followed. At trial,
all parties agreed that a loss of government funding, as a result of
delay, could meet this statutory requirement. However, contradictory
evidence presented at trial as to whether the City would lose its
funding if the project did not begin within a certain time frame,
necessitated a finding by the trial judge as to what evidence she
believed more reliable. This court upheld the trial judge's conclusion
that the City could possibly lose its funding unless work began within
as short a time period as reasonable.
Thus, the court held that the City had proven the requisite public
necessity and public use of the drainage project and the possibility of
irreparable harm resulting if the project proceeded through the
course of a lengthy normal eminent domain proceeding. Therefore,
the court deemed the City entitled to immediate possession of the
property under the state "quick take" statute.
Lucinda K Henriksen
MONTANA
Barnes v. Thompson Falls, 979 P.2d 1275 (Mont. 1999) (finding that a
statutorily authorized activity or facility cannot be a nuisance unless
the plaintiff shows that the defendant exceeded it statutory authority
or that the defendant was negligent in carrying out its statutory
authority, resulting in a qualified nuisance).
In 1978, Sally Barnes purchased a duplex in Thompson Falls,
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Montana. The basement door was level with the alley behind the
house. Barnes began to experience flooding problems. In the early
1980's, the city established a municipal sewer system and installed a
storm drain in the alley behind Barnes' home. While this solved the
flooding problem for a time, a regraveling project, which heightened
the alley's surface, and the expansion of a highway through the city
caused further flooding. By 1993, the problem caused Barnes to file a
complaint with the city. Thompson Falls responded by replacing the
existing storm drain line and chip-sealing the alley. Finally, in 1996, a
heavy rainstorm caused the storm drain line to backup. Run-off
pooled in the alley and flooded the basement with three inches of
caustic sludge. Barnes filed suit alleging that the city negligently
designed and maintained the sewer and storm drain system, and that
the system constituted a private nuisance.
The district court denied Barnes' request to instruct the jury on
nuisance.
Therefore, the jury decided the case based only on
Thompson Falls' negligence. The jury found the defendant not liable.
Barnes appealed this decision on the grounds that the district court
abused its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on nuisance.
Thompson Falls argued that the statute specifically authorized the
nuisance alleged by Barnes and that she could only prevail on her
theory of nuisance by proving negligence.
The primary issue facing this court concerned whether a plaintiff
could bring a nuisance action against a defendant engaged in a
statutorily authorized activity when Montana statutes indicated that
such activity should not "be deemed a nuisance." The court first
examined Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls. Wilhelm held that where a
statutorily authorized activity existed, the plaintiffs, in order to prevail,
must prove that the acts complained of were either wholly outside of
statutory authorization or so negligently performed as to constitute a
nuisance.
The court determined that Wilhelm recognized the
difference between an absolute nuisance (where negligence is
immaterial) and a qualified nuisance (which is predicated on
negligence).
The court then looked at California law, the basis of the Montana
statute. California courts have recognized that where an activity was
authorized by statute and could not be a nuisance, the manner in
which the activity is performed may constitute a nuisance. The court
also noted that a lawful action might become a nuisance by reason of
its negligent performance. The court then held that, under Montana
law, statutorily authorized activities were not a nuisance unless the
plaintiff: (1) could show that the defendant acted wholly outside of its
statutory authority or: (2) could prove a qualified nuisance by averring
negligent design, construction, operation or maintenance.
Applying the facts to the law, the court ruled that Barnes had not
shown that Thompson Falls' activities were outside of its statutory
authority. Barnes' only remedy relied on her ability to prove the city
was negligent in its design, construction, operation, or maintenance of
the storm drain line. Based on the jury's finding of no negligence, the
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court concluded that Thompson Falls was not negligent in its
operation or maintenance of the storm drain line behind Barnes'
duplex. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision.
Karina Serkin

NEWJERSEY
Bubis v. Kassin, 733 A.2d 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)
(holding that an express easement was not automatically extinguished
when the easement area was below the mean high water line and that
when the easement was below the mean high water line the public
trust doctrine applied).
In 1883, developers prepared and subsequently recorded a
subdivision map for the seaside community of Loch Arbour (know
known as the Village of Loch Arbour). The 183 lots on the map
contained a number of east-west streets that terminated at the beach.
The most easterly north-south street on the map was an unnamed
street running along an area described as "Bluff," which immediately
adjoined an area described as "Beach." As the developers sold the lots,
the deeds conveyed not only the designated lots to the property owner,
but also an easement which was described as "on, over and across a
certain strip of land, being a part of Beach and Bluff, as shown on the
aforesaid Map of Loch Arbour ......
The Plaintiffs owned homes on inland lots on Edgemont Avenue,
which was one of the east-west streets shown on the map. Plaintiff
Bubis' home was directly across the street from defendant Kassin's
eight oceanfront lots, which were on either side of Edgemont Avenue,
bordered to the west by Ocean Place and to the east by the unnamed
street shown on the 1883 map. Kassin purchased its lots in 1995, and
shortly thereafter created a twelve to fourteen foot high sand berm
along the westerly border using a bulldozer.
Plaintiffs appealed the lower court's finding that plaintiffs'
easement was extinguished because the easement area was below the
mean high water line. Plaintiffs also appealed the dismissal of its claim
that Kassin's sand berm interfered with plaintiffs' right to an
unobstructed view of the Atlantic Ocean and that Kassin's six-foot
fence violated a restrictive covenant.
The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's
finding that all of the area described as Beach and Bluff on the 1883
map was below the mean high water line. However, the court found
that the deeds to plaintiffs' predecessors in title conveyed implied
private easements over Edgemont Avenue to afford access to the beach
and the ocean. The erosion of the Beach and Bluff did not extinguish
those easements.

